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Abstract: 
The author, a graduate student with Gilles de la Tourette's syndrome, proposes that pre-tic sensory experiences 
result from a specific attentional deficit. Based on his own introspective case study, the author argues that the 
premonitory urges that precede tics are not unique sensory events, but rather are manifestations of 
somatosensory hyperawareness which serves as the aversive stimulus toward which tics are purposively 
directed. An "attentional tic" theoretical framework for the study of Tourette's syndrome is suggested and 
discussed in reference to inhibitory theories of attention. 
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Article: 
Joseph Bliss (1980), a patient with a 62-year history of Gilles de la Tourette's syndrome (TS), first documented 
the intentional nature of tics by articulating the subjective experience of having tics and the perceptual events 
that surround tics. Bliss asserted that tics are preceded by aversive sensations which develop in TS patients 
through a process in which sensory events such as tactile perceptions take on a special exigence. Tics are thus 
produced to relieve these sensations, but they only allow a fleeting reprieve. According to Bliss, then, TS is not 
a movement disorder; rather, it centrally involves a hypersensitivity to somatosensory stimulation. 
 
Bliss' (1980) views were initially confirmed by case studies (Bullen and Hemsley, 1983; Kurlan et al., 1989) 
and were then elaborated by surveys in which more than 80% of TS patients reported that tics are produced as 
intentional responses to aversive sensory phenomena (A. Cohen and Leckman, 1992; Lang, 1991; Leckman et 
al., 1993). 
 
Now that "sensory tics" (Shapiro et al., 1988) have been widely reported (see also George et al., 1993), it is 
necessary to refine our understanding of the tic experience. To this end, I present below an introspective case 
study that provides a unique phenomenological account of TS. In doing so I formulate a working explanation of 
TS tics' intentionality and the quintessence of the pre-tic condition; furthermore, I suggest that the 
etiopathogenesis of TS is less "sensory" than "attentional" and that pre-tic sensations are manifestations of 
somatosensory hyperattention. That is, due to deficient attentional inhibition, the TS patient suffers from an 
oppressive hyperawareness of what his or her skin, muscles, and joints feel like. 
 
CASE STUDY 
I experienced TS onset 19 years ago, at age 7. My first symptom was head jerking, and subsequent (primarily 
simple tic) symptoms included facial tics, extremity tics, vocal tics (e.g., squeaking, grunting), and touching 
tics. From ages 11 to 13 I was prescribed haloperidol, but eventually, because of side effects, I was prescribed 
clonidine. One year later, clonidine was deemed ineffective and all medication was discontinued. 
 
Pre-Tic "Sensations" and the Purpose of Tics 
Although some clinicians may believe tics to be as subjectively purposeless as a muscle twitch, there is 
really no phenomenological similarity between an involuntary muscle spasm and a TS tic; muscle spasms are 
introspectively uncontrollable, whereas tics are intentional and predictable. From the quickest eye blink to the 
most deliberate shoulder shrug, tics are preceded by a "sensory" experience which has proved difficult to 
describe (for example: "unfulfilled sensation" [Bliss, 1980]; "itch" [Bullen and Hemsley, 1983]; "creaky 
feeling" [A. Cohen and Leckman, 1992]; "feeling of pressure" [Leckman et al., 1993]). Importantly, these 
sensations are not mere precursors to tics; they precipitate tics. That is, more than providing a signal of 
imminence, the pre-tic sensation acts as the aversive stimulus toward which tics are directed. 
 
An itch is an appropriate analogy for the pre-tic sensation inasmuch as it is an adverse and urgent stimulus for 
action (Bliss, 1980). The analogy fails, however, because unlike the pre-tic state, an itch is most commonly a 
narrowly localized sensation which may be terminated by scratching. The term "pre-tic sensation" is a 
misnomer because the TS feeling is acute and omnipresent; sensations do nor suddenly appear before the onset 
of tics. To have TS is to be pathologically "itchy," and tics act as the most effective (yet ephemeral) method of 
"scratching." 
 
Perhaps the best description for the sensory state of TS is a somatic hyperattention: It is not as itch-like as it is 
an enduring somatosensory bombardment. I experience the TS state as one of keen bodily awareness, or a 
continual consciousness of muscle, joint, and skin sensations. For example, when sitting in a chair, I do not lose 
awareness of the tactile sensation of the seat against my body, nor can I ignore the deeper somatic sensations of 
what my back and legs feel like. 
 
The TS state is omnipresent with few exceptions (e.g., during intense concentration or attentional focus, such as 
in lecturing), but it is not constant in bodily location or intensity. Its primary location may span the torso or may 
be isolated to a single eyelid, often depending on the presence or absence of salient external stimulation. For 
example, I have experienced increases in throat tics after wearing a necktie, increases in facial tics with 
sunburned skin, increases in toe movement after wearing tight shoes, and increases in head-jerking after 
swimming. 
 
TS state intensity also varies under certain conditions, that is, my level of somatic awareness at any particular 
body site will continuously change. For instance, if a tic is temporarily stopped, its respective bodily location 
becomes less ignorable. If all tics are suppressed, virtually all of my joints and muscles begin to demand my 
attention. The TS state heightens to a stiffening feeling, such that my skin feels like a hardened casing and my 
joints feel as though they are becoming rigid. The intensity rises until it becomes so unpleasant and distracting 
that tics must be executed (with a compulsion that rivals the scratching of a severe itch). 
 
The reason that tics are only marginally effective in providing relief, however, is that unlike scratching an itch, 
tics do not make the hyperattention go away. Tics merely reset the TS state temporarily back to a baseline. 
Thus, tics are not themselves pleasant, but they do provide a temporary respite from the persistent 
hyperawareness. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Although most TS patients report sensory tic symptoms, some (particularly young children) do not. Future 
work, then, should aim to determine the factors responsible for these individual differences. While in my own 
case, my realization of the pre-tic state may have resulted from a developmental shift in my ability to 
distinguish compulsive behavior from involuntary behavior, it also likely emerged from a change in symptoms. 
 
My childhood tics (such as eye blinking) were produced in rapid succession, making it difficult to trace their 
impetus to overt sensations. In late adolescence, however, I also developed more deliberately executed dystonic 
tics (such as neck craning). These tics were painstakingly slow and bizarre (i.e., lacking in any ethological 
significance), which allowed and encouraged the intense introspective analysis that helped me to recognize their 
intentionality. For any given patient, then, I suggest that the awareness and/or reporting of premonitory urges 
will, most importantly, depend on his or her symptom selection, in addition to an understanding of subtle 
concepts such as voluntary, impulsive, and compulsive actions. 
 
Although a conscious awareness of the TS stare demands sophisticated meta-attention, it is not necessary to 
elicit tics. I propose that TS patients are not subject to exotic sensations per se (as the notion of sensory tics 
suggests); rather, they suffer from a chronic inability to suppress the preconscious processing of (or covert 
orienting to; see Posner et al., 1980) normal somatosensory stimulation. That is, somatic hyperattention is 
locally exacerbated by external stimuli (e.g., by wearing a necktie) because loci of high somatosensory 
stimulation enhance the TS state by recruiting attention to affected body sites. Once these sites become 
selectively attended to, they may serve as the target for tics for hours or even days. 
 
While the above may suggest a primary sensory abnormality in TS, the establishment of an intense, local 
sensory hyperawareness does not always depend on external stimulation or motor activity. In fact, the TS state 
may be present in the absence of sensory input. Thus, as is consistent with the attentional tic hypothesis, merely 
directing attention or thought to a body site may locally exacerbate the TS state. Even thinking about 
experiencing tics in the abstract is enough to provoke somatic attention. 
 
Finally, even with the execution of simple tics, sometimes the hyperattention does not diminish. For example, I 
recently developed a complex tic of touching my stomach after meals, which coincides with a preexisting 
stomach muscle tensing tic. Seemingly, if tics were executed solely to relieve local body sensations, one tic 
should be sufficient. Of late, however, I have not been exercising and I am thus concerned about my weight. 
After meals, repeated stomach touching has come to serve as a check for stomach protrusion. The muscle 
tensing tic continues; the attention recruited by my abdomen, however, is no longer limited to its feel, for it now 
incorporates worry. Thus, somatosensory hyperawareness has become entangled with a more cognitive and 
emotional hyperattention. The inability to inhibit somatic attention has merged with an inability to inhibit 
thought. 
 
Note here the similarity to obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), a condition with a well-established 
comorbidity with TS (e.g., Cummings and Frankel, 1985). While it is beyond the scope of this paper to speak 
directly to OCD issues, questions concerning the attentional continuum between TS and OCD, and likewise, the 
attentional association between sensation and thought, may be further explored through an attentional 
framework for studying premonitory urges and thoughts in TS and OCD (John March, personal 
communication). 
 
Such a framework may already be available in cognitive psychology. Although cognitive psychologists pri-
marily study visual attention, hypotheses from this domain may apply to the somatic attention dysfunction 
which I propose occurs in TS. Such behavioral work has focused on the ways in which goal-relevant environ-
mental information becomes highlighted against goal-irrelevant distracter stimulation, and there is a growing 
literature which suggests that objects that are selected against are actively suppressed (Hasher and Zacks, 1988; 
Tipper and Cranston, 1985). Thus, recent theories argue that selective attention may depend on both excitatory 
and inhibitory processes, through which relevant stimuli are targeted for processing while irrelevant stimuli are 
actively denied access to response systems (e.g., Navon, 1989). 
 
Empirical evidence for such attentional inhibition has come from the "negative priming" paradigm (Tipper and 
Cranston, 1985), in which subjects selectively respond to a class of targets (e.g., green letters) while ignoring a 
class of distractors (e.g., red letters). Negative priming is said to occur when the response to a target is slowed 
as a result of that stimulus having recently appeared as a distractor. This slowing is believed to arise from the 
time taken to overcome the suppression applied to the current target when it had previously been a distracter. 
 
As measured by negative priming, deficient inhibitory processing of distractors has been demonstrated in 
subject populations thought to exhibit attentional dysfunction, such as older adults (e.g., Hasher et al., 1991; 
Kane et al., 1994), obsessive-compulsive adults (Enright and Beech, 1993), and schizophrenics (Beech et al., 
1989), whose thought disorders may result from their inability to inhibit irrelevant thoughts and sensory stimuli 
(e.g., Frith, 1979). Analogously, experimental support already exists for attentional dysfunction in TS (e.g., 
Bruun, 1984), and future visual and/or tactile negative priming studies with TS patients may empirically support 
the hypothesis that somatic hyperawareness is a manifestation of deficient inhibition. 
 
Although a review of the attention literature is not intended here, specifying the mechanisms that support my 
phenomenological description of the TS state will require a broader perspective on "attention" than that already 
discussed. Experimental work under an inhibitory framework may provide a starting point; however, 
other behavioral indices of attention, such as "engagement" and "disengagement" (e.g., Posner et al., 1980), 
might prove important to examine with TS patients, particularly in determining whether inhibitory failure 
occurs during covert orienting or at a later, more conscious level of processing. 
 
Furthermore, a cognitive framework for TS study may be complemented by (and inform) our current 
understanding of the neural circuitry common to both tics and attentional performance. In this regard, a 
promising model was recently proposed to account for obsessive-compulsive behavior (Wise and Rapoport, 
1989). The model provides that motivational input from orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate cortex may 
disinhibit thalamocortical circuits in the absence of sensory input, and suggests that in OCD there is a failure to 
block the disinhibitory influence of motivation on behavior. As a result, persons with OCD commit abnormal 
actions which rely on internal, rather than external, stimulation (e.g., repetitive washing of clean hands). For TS, 
a similar model may prove applicable to tics' attentional stimulus. For example, the neural circuits between 
sensory associational cortex, the basal ganglia, and the frontal lobes warrant consideration, for they have been 
implicated in TS (e.g., Chappell et al., 1990) and also figure prominently in neuropsychological models of 
attentional selection Q. Cohen and Servan-Schreiber, 1992; Pennington, in press; Weinberger, 1993) and 
inhibition (Dempster, 1992) which are consistent with behavioral data (Hasher and Zacks, 1988; Zacks and 
Hasher, in press). 
 
Summary 
The TS state of chronic somatic hyperattention may lie on a pathological end of a somatic-sensitivity continuum 
which is delineated by inhibitory attentional control, and thus the basic dysfunction in TS symptomatology may 
be explained as failed attentional inhibition. Furthermore, it is the ultimate link of the physical and cognitive 
experience of TS which suggests that the notion of attentional tics most effectively captures the essence and the 
cause of tics. The current conception of sensory tics does not suggest as parsimonious a framework as 
attentional tics for examining relatively complex tic phenomena or unravelling the intimate connections which 
are becoming dearer between TS and OCD. 
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